The 1973 oil crisis and the designing of a Danish energy policy by Rüdiger, Mogens
www.ssoar.info
The 1973 oil crisis and the designing of a Danish
energy policy
Rüdiger, Mogens
Veröffentlichungsversion / Published Version
Zeitschriftenartikel / journal article
Zur Verfügung gestellt in Kooperation mit / provided in cooperation with:
GESIS - Leibniz-Institut für Sozialwissenschaften
Empfohlene Zitierung / Suggested Citation:
Rüdiger, M. (2014). The 1973 oil crisis and the designing of a Danish energy policy. Historical Social Research, 39(4),
94-112. https://doi.org/10.12759/hsr.39.2014.4.94-112
Nutzungsbedingungen:
Dieser Text wird unter einer CC BY Lizenz (Namensnennung) zur
Verfügung gestellt. Nähere Auskünfte zu den CC-Lizenzen finden
Sie hier:
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/deed.de
Terms of use:
This document is made available under a CC BY Licence
(Attribution). For more Information see:
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0
Diese Version ist zitierbar unter / This version is citable under:
https://nbn-resolving.org/urn:nbn:de:0168-ssoar-404893
Historical Social Research 39 (2014) 4, 94-112 │© GESIS 
DOI: 10.12759/hsr.39.2014.4.94-112 
The 1973 Oil Crisis and the Designing of a  
Danish Energy Policy  
Mogens Rüdiger ∗ 
Abstract: »Die Ölkrise von 1973 und die Entwicklung einer dänischen Energie-
politik«. The Danish energy supply was well-functioning before the oil crisis be-
gan in 1973, but the country was highly dependent on imported oil. Thus, the 
crisis hit a key nerve in its society. This paper analyzes the energy supply before 
and after 1973, especially the immediate and long-term measures taken to en-
sure supply security. I argue that the two most important features were the es-
tablishment of a regulative regime and the construction of a diversified energy 
supply. Governmental regulation was considered a precondition for a successful 
turnaround of the energy sector from an extreme dependency on imported oil 
to a diversified energy mix. However, increased CO2 emissions soon made evi-
dent that the multi-tier energy supply system was fairly short sighted, and, in 
the wake of the Brundtland Report, Denmark entered a new and more climate-
friendly path. 
Keywords: Oil crisis, energy policy, energy planning, wind power, diversification. 
1.  Introduction 
The Suez Crisis in 1956 and, in particular, the Six Day War in 1967 were warn-
ings that energy supply was a vulnerable issue of growing importance in mod-
ern Western society. Increasing portions of the energy supply were based on oil 
and oil products. The demand for oil was rising in all types of production, espe-
cially industrial production, and consumption within transport and housing was 
constantly increasing. 
Growing consumption was a common feature of the Western countries, but 
the potential to meet demands differed between countries with their own energy 
resources and countries that had to import them. Denmark belonged in the 
latter category. Except for a small amount of wood and a small quantity of 
lignite, no national resources were available.1 All energy had to be imported. 
Therefore, the post-World War II period was characterized by an ongoing quest 
for fuels. For the first many years, coal was imported at steady, relatively high 
                                                             
∗  Mogens Rüdiger, Department of Culture and Global Studies, Aalborg University, 
Kroghstræde 1, 9220 Aalborg Ø, Denmark; rudiger@cgs.aau.dk. 
1  The first oil in the Danish part of the North Sea was produced in the summer of 1972.  
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prices from the United Kingdom and the United States, as well as from Poland 
and South Africa. The last-mentioned countries were at times difficult trading 
partners. In South Africa, the apartheid regime caused the country to be subject 
to an international embargo; trade with Communist Poland usually put the 
Danish at a disadvantage, since it was difficult to export industrial products to 
Eastern Europe without coming into conflict with Western strategic export 
controls.2 Therefore, oil was a welcomed alternative. Increasing output, good 
quality, low prices, and the fact that it was much easier to handle than coal 
were factors that would cause all sectors of society to accept the transition from 
coal to oil. 
In the 1950s and 1960s, the Western countries experienced a spectacular de-
velopment of which the key watchword was “modernization,” understood as 
industrialization and mechanization. Enormous effort was invested in post-war 
reconstruction. The Marshall Plan facilitated increased productivity and inter-
national trade among Western countries, international institutions, and the 
restoration of the world market, with free trade as an objective.3 All of this 
transformed the Western countries to a degree that, unlike during the Interwar 
period, ordinary people did not need to fight to survive, but could concentrate 
on living – and, thus, consume energy. In short, energy was essential for the 
daily operation of society.4 
Denmark was a latecomer in creating a welfare state. Until the late 1950s, it 
was predominantly an agricultural society, with the majority of the population 
living in the countryside and with jobs in industries dependent on agriculture. 
Energy consumption was correspondingly low. While the foundation of the 
country’s welfare state took hold in the 1950s, it was not until the end of the 
decade that it really unfolded. The industry and the service sectors grew rapid-
ly, single-family homes became the preferred housing type, televisions and cars 
entered the lives of most families, and in the 1960s, the public sector expanded 
from being one of the smallest (measured relative to GDP) to the largest in 
Europe.5 
Consequently, Denmark was also a latecomer in regard to the consumption of 
energy (cf. Table 1). Only around 1960 did consumption reach a level equivalent 
to that of the countries with which Denmark normally compares itself.6 
  
                                                             
2  See Rüdiger 2011a. 
3  Hogan 1989. 
4  Chick 2007, 147-50. For the implications of the welfare state for the ordinary man, see Judt 
2007. Chapter X and Hobsbawm 1994, chapter 9-11. 
5  Christiansen et al 2006; De Coninck-Smith and Rüdiger 2007.  
6  Wistoft, Thorndahl and Petersen 1992; Rüdiger 2011b. 
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Table 1:  Electricity Consumption per Inhabitant (kWh/Person), 1950-2006 
 1950 1970 1990 2000 2006 
Denmark   484   2,648   5,598   6,330   6,330 
Sweden 2,444   7,128 13,959 14,940 14,720 
Norway 5,382 13,179 21,205 23,930 23,230 
Germany   894   3,999   6,222   5,960   6,380 
UK 1,377   3,699   4,813   5,620   5,660 
France   801   2,355   5,363   6,360   7,010 
The Netherlands   682   2,682   4,967   6,150   6,500 
Italy   532   1,925   3,723   4,730   5,250 
USA 2,630   6,576 10,555 12,110 12,430 
Source: Wistoft et. al 1992, 111, and statistics on Danish electricity supply. 
 
A main point of this article is that this development took place while Denmark 
did not have a formulated national energy policy and even though all of the 
energy the country needed had to be imported. The political attitude towards 
energy before the 1973 crisis was that, as long as the market provided an abun-
dant amount of primary energy at the lowest possible prices, there was no need 
for the government to interfere in the market. Except for a low tax on gasoline, 
the policy was one of free access to the energy market and no taxes on import-
ed energy. This policy reflected the fact that Denmark did not produce primary 
energy before 1972.7 Consequently, the Danish state played a role in only trade 
negotiations with the Communist countries – for instance, in connection with 
the import of oil and natural gas from the Soviet Union and coal from Poland.8 
2.  Why was the 1973 Crisis a Shock? 
Most of the articles in this HSR Special Issue state that the energy crisis was 
underway for some time before October 1973, and that the Arab action was 
merely the straw that broke the camel’s back. In many Western countries, both 
policy makers and the public were aware that energy prices and supply security 
had become issues, with the potential to threaten economic growth and prosper-
ity. Most countries were considering, or even acting upon, improving their 
energy supply. In that sense, the cut in energy supplies following the outbreak 
of the Yom Kippur War aggravated the problem, but did not change the game, 
as was the situation in Denmark. 
Such awareness was not present to the same degree in Denmark. Not that 
the administration was not aware of the threat of a reduced energy supply, but 
this concern was overshadowed by the combination of political leaders choos-
                                                             
7  Ministry of Commerce 1974, 52. 
8  Boje 2012, 74-81 and 122-32. 
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ing to address other important issues and the lack of regulatory tools for ad-
dressing the complicated energy situation.9  
In addition to the problems Denmark shared with most of the Western 
world, the country also faced growing extreme left and right wing political 
parties and an outspoken and widespread critique of the welfare state. Three 
major reforms in particular encouraged anti-statist attitudes: a new administra-
tive division of the country in 1971, which reduced the number of municipali-
ties; a fundamental restructuring of the tax system in 1970/71; and the coun-
try’s decision to become a member of the European Community, decided by a 
referendum that passed on October 2nd, 1972, after a long and intense cam-
paign and required Denmark to act in a new way within the international sphere 
as of January 1st, 1973. Besides, the oil embargo and price increase added a 
sense of crisis to the discontent of a large part of the population.  
This whole melting pot of problems and conflicts turned the Danish Parlia-
ment upside down at the general elections on December 4th, 1973. The election 
campaign coincided with the culmination of the oil crisis and took place in the 
shadow of completely unusual provisions against the increasing prices and 
reduced supply of oil. In the new parliament, the extreme and protesting par-
ties, which were not prepared to take part in the exercise of power, won more 
than a third of the 179 seats.10 In a Danish context, political polarization of such 
dimensions was exceptional, and the parliamentary system was to some extent 
malfunctioning in the 1970s. However, the efforts to curb the energy crisis won 
the support of all of the responsible political parties, center-right as well as 
center-left.11 
If we are to provide a rational explanation for the reluctance of Danish deci-
sion makers to pay much attention to the energy problems that arose during the 
early 1970s, this must be that they were focusing on other challenges and hardly 
had the capacity to address energy as a problem, at least not as long as it was not 
an urgent problem. All of the efforts put into the aforementioned reforms and into 
the negotiations around EC membership, which began in 1970 and were conclud-
ed summer 1972, probably overshadowed the emerging energy problem.12 
As mentioned, this did not mean, however, that the administration just 
closed their eyes to the difficulties in providing energy security. Natural gas 
attracted much attention in the 1960s, probably because of the large finds at 
Groningen in the Netherlands. This was also the case in Denmark. But it was 
not only concerns about supply security that followed the Six Day War in 
                                                             
9  Villaume 2005, 92-6; Lidegaard 2009, 291-304. 
10  Ibid., 95. Surprisingly, the oil crisis and related energy issues were not important topics in 
the election campaign (Dansk Data Arkiv: Indholdsanalyse af valgkampen i radio og TV1973 
(1996) <http://samfund.dda.dk/ddakatalog//ddppdf/doku0647.pdf>). 
11  Lidegaard 2009; Rüdiger 1999, 99. 
12  The United Kingdom was in a similar situation; cf. McGowan 2011, 192. 
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1967; a small group of civil servants in the Ministry of Commerce became 
interested in what actions would be taken if natural gas was found in the Dan-
ish part of the North Sea. They opted for building a national grid, even outlin-
ing the routing of the grid and an organization to handle the gas. Their consid-
erations ended up as merely paperwork, however. Gas production in the North 
Sea was years away, and some deadlocked negotiations with Philipps about the 
purchase of natural gas highlighted the fact that the Danish state held a weak 
bargaining position. Therefore, the only lesson learned by the Danish state was 
that the negotiators lacked the necessary competences to effectively act in the 
energy market. That said, the state did show an interest in energy problems and 
did consider acting upon them. Thus, in March 1972, a fully state-owned natu-
ral gas company, DNG Ltd., was established in order to build up expertise in 
the natural gas trade.13 
In hindsight, but justified by political actions in other Western European 
countries, it is striking that Denmark did not succeed in creating alternatives to 
its reliance on oil imports. In my opinion, this reflects a lack of political under-
standing of the need for a national energy policy and national planning. As a 
consequence, Denmark had to start almost from scratch when the Arab coun-
tries launched its “oil weapon” against the Western world.  
However, action within the energy market in the early 1970s was difficult 
for any country without its own energy resources. Four options to reduce the 
dependency of imported oil were available. One was a partial return to coal in 
power generation, and the second was to introduce new fuels into the energy 
mix – i.e., natural gas and nuclear power. Given that North Sea production was 
expected to begin in August 1972, the first position seemed hopelessly anti-
quated, while the other could be implemented only as a long-term strategy.14 A 
third option was energy conservation, but as energy consumption equated eco-
nomic growth, this was not an issue before the 1973 oil crisis. Between 1970 
and 1972, total Danish energy consumption stagnated, probably because of 
lower growth in industrial production; but the small price rise on oil might also 
have caused energy consumption to grow at a slower pace than the GDP for the 
first time since 1962.15  
Finally, rather than promoting energy conservation, electricity companies 
spent a lot of effort on improving efficiency. The electricity system had been 
undergoing an ongoing centralization process since World War II, with the 
introduction of bigger and more efficient power stations. In 1950, 420 small 
                                                             
13  Rüdiger 1998, 28-36. December the 2nd, DNG Ltd. [Danish Natural Gas Company] was re-
named to DONG Ltd. [Danish Oil and Natural Gas Company]. In 2006, DONG and five power 
companies merged into DONG Energy (Rüdiger 2011b). 
14  Ministry of Commerce 1974, 52; Rüdiger 1998. 
15  Ministry of Commerce 1974, 17-27. Prior to 1962, the GDP was growing faster than energy 
use, but during the rest of the 1960s, the opposite situation was the case. 
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power stations kept Denmark’s electricity going, but by 1970, this number had 
been reduced to 140.16 In addition, combining heat and power became popular 
in the 1960s, with the establishment of 300 new power stations from 1960 to 
1970, as compared to a total of 80 in 1959.17 
All in all, when the crisis surfaced in October of 1973, around 90 percent of 
Denmark’s energy consumption was based on oil, and 90 percent of the oil was 
imported from the Middle East. In hindsight, this 90-90 situation was problem-
atic and short sighted, because it made Denmark vulnerable to fluctuations in 
the world oil market and, in particular, to the conflicts in the Middle East.18 
The oil crisis thus initiated a change in the rules of the game, because the 
energy sector was no longer just left to market mechanisms. A national energy 
policy and a regulatory framework that would make it possible for the admin-
istration to guarantee energy security found their way into the political agenda. 
Consequently, a political and regulative regime was established between 1973 
and 1979.19 In short, since 1973, the development of the energy sector has been 
policy driven, and the overall objective has been to secure a sufficient energy 
supply for the entire country.  
This state intervention clearly fits into the classic welfare-state method of 
solving problems. A dynamic relationship between state and market was to be 
created, so that the state would assume responsibility for resolving market 
failures and provide a framework for fine-tuning the trajectory of the market. 
At the same time, the purpose of government intervention in the market was to 
provide supply security and low prices. This soon turned into a significant 
government intervention in the energy sector, such as the regulation of the 
energy mix and a reduction in energy companies’ freedom of action. In this 
process, questions with a more overall relevance also surfaced, such as if and 
how the strong correlation between GDP growth and growth in energy con-
sumption could be decoupled.20 
In the late 1980s, this newly established regulatory regime was confronted 
by two almost simultaneous challenges. First, the Brundtland Report and its 
focus on a sustainable development called into question Danish supply security 
policy. By 1990, this policy had already been redesigned as a more environ-
mentally friendly energy plan with the neutral title Energy 2000. It soon turned 
out that this policy change was to be followed by a second challenge, namely 
the European Union-initiated plan to subject the energy sector to competition in 
order to improve the efficiency of power generation. In the course of 30 years, 
the rules of the game changed three times: in the 1970s, in 1990, and again in 
                                                             
16  Wistoft 1992, 68. 
17  Skov and Petersen 2007, 30 and 50. 
18  Ministry of Commerce 1974. 
19  Rüdiger 2007. 
20  Rüdiger 2007, 57-69. 
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1999, when a policy reform introduced competition into the energy sector.21 
Only the first (and probably the most comprehensive) volte-face is discussed in 
this article. 
3.  How the Crisis Hit Denmark 
Economically, the oil crisis of 1973 and 1974 was a serious blow to a Western 
economy that was already suffering under the effects of the multi-year crisis of 
the Bretton Woods system, which was put under serious pressure when the 
United States dropped the gold standard in March 1971. Currency fluctuations 
and more uncertain economic growth were already a part of everyday life when 
Egypt and Syria began the Yom Kippur War on October 6th, 1973. The result 
was slower growth, higher inflation, high interest rates, and high unemploy-
ment. In Denmark, as in other countries, economic policy turned out to be a 
shaky and ambiguous struggle against unemployment and a deficit in the bal-
ance of payments. 
In October 1973, the Arab Organization of Oil Producing Countries, 
OAPEC decided to implement a reduction in the oil supply, which added to 
OPEC’s efforts to increase the oil prices.22 Since 1971, OPEC demanded higher 
export prices and tax rates, and the oil companies lacked the strength to defend 
the status quo. The OPEC countries also tried to limit their total production, so 
that oil companies could not neutralize the decline in production in one country 
by increasing production in another. On the top of this, American oil produc-
tion declined, and the Nixon administration imposed price controls on gasoline 
in order to keep it cheap. In that sense, the well-known balance between supply 
and demand was already under attack as the Yom Kippur War broke out. The 
Arab oil producing countries agreed to a substantial reduction of output, cutting 
oil production by at least 5 percent from the September level and an additional 
5 percent in each succeeding month until Israel withdrew from the territories 
they had occupied in 1967. Furthermore, OAPEC launched an embargo against 
the United States and the Netherlands because of the two countries’ support of 
Israel during the war. The embargo, and especially OPEC’s insistence on more 
favorable prices, led to a quadrupling of the posted price to $11.65 per barrel of 
Arabian Light.23 
Although Denmark wholeheartedly supported Israel, the country was initial-
ly not on the embargo list. However, the country was just about to find itself on 
the list when, at a closed meeting in November 1973 in the small provincial 
                                                             
21  Lovinfosse 2008 describes the renewable electricity policy. 
22  The Arab countries were the vast majority of OPEC. 
23  Nye 2001, 218; Yergin 1991, 625. The posted price was $1.80 in 1970 and $2.90 in mid-
1973. 
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town of Middelfart, Prime Minister Anker Jørgensen commented that the Arab 
policy was actually a desire to drive Israel into the sea.24 His statement was 
leaked to the press, and the Arab countries immediately threatened to embargo 
Denmark. But it remained only a threat. The embargo was lifted on March 
18th, 1974. The high prices turned out to be long-lasting, however, and had a 
great impact on Western countries. 
4.  The Immediate Response 
From a Danish perspective, the quadrupling of the prices represented a serious 
challenge to the economy, but the embargo threat also highlighted the country’s 
unfortunate dependence on oil from the Middle East. So even if the price in-
crease was the most significant challenge, the Danish government’s response to 
the crisis primarily addressed the problem of supply security. Thus, in the 
1970s and most of the 1980s, policy measures – both immediate actions and 
when a strategic restructuring of the energy supply was on the agenda – fo-
cused on securing the supply. These measures were similar to those taken in the 
Netherlands and West Germany, but the resulting energy plans or regulative 
regimes were still country-specific. 
An important aspect of the response to OPEC’s challenge was that the state 
assumed the responsibility of the energy supply by trying to change the behavior 
of the Danish people. Two types of responses were presented: bans on or guide-
lines for certain types of behavior, and subsidies for improving housing insulation 
and campaigns for energy saving, such as lowering room temperatures.25 
Danes spend a large portion of their total energy consumption on heating 
their homes, and when OAPEC started their action, winter was approaching. 
Since supplies began to fall in October, the question arose as to how Danes 
could help by stretching out their stocks and utilizing them in a more efficient 
way. One of the most dramatic actions was imported from Holland – namely, 
the ban on private car driving on Sundays. The ban took effect on November 
25th and lasted eleven Sundays (December 23rd was excluded). However, since 
Sunday was the day with the fewest cars on the road anyway, the effect was not 
great – perhaps with the exception of the Danish population’s mood, positive or 
negative.26 Speed limits were also introduced: 60 km/hour within towns and 80 
outside of urbanized areas. Every other street lamp was turned off, and urban 
culture was hit with a ban on neon signs and illuminated shop windows at 
certain times of the night. Christmas exhibits shined less brightly, and family 
                                                             
24  Villaume 2005, 95.  
25  Rudiger 1998, 47. For a discussion of the various regulatory instruments, cf Ministry of 
Energy 1981, appendix 2, 9-16. 
26  Mejlby and Wagner 2012. 
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visits were hampered, since the timetables for trains, buses, and air traffic were 
curtailed. Room temperatures were lowered. In public buildings, this was easy; 
the authorities simply had to issue an order. In private homes, it was far more 
difficult. Campaigns were launched to make people change their individual 
behavior – for example, to wear sweaters. Showers instead of bathtubs were 
also promoted, as well as shorter and colder showers, the insulation of windows 
and doors, and so on.27 
To many people, television campaigns were not required for them to change 
their behavior. The increased prices of oil products were effective enough in 
curbing energy use. Many older houses and apartments were heated by kero-
sene stoves. So when the price of kerosene soared, a price cap was imposed. 
Also, the price of fuel oil for heaters and electricity rose significantly within a 
very short period of time.  
Prices remained high even after the OAPEC embargo was lifted in March 
1974, and in 1979, they once again rose steeply, triggered by the outbreak of 
the Iranian Revolution. Stable and low energy prices were history. 
A final, immediate tool to address energy security was that, in accordance 
with the International Energy Agency’s targets for government-controlled 
strategic oil reserves, the national gas company, Danish Natural Gas Company, 
Ltd. (DNG), was instructed to buy oil for Danish stocks. The company then 
changed its name to DONG Ltd. (i.e., Danish Oil and Natural Gas). This action 
was unsuccessful, however. In the winter of the first oil crisis, the company failed 
to buy any oil, probably because it was a state-owned company. The oil compa-
nies demanded higher prices of DONG than of their own subsidiaries, and only 
the Saudi Arabian company showed an interest; but a deal was never reached.28 
Thus, the government took a broad spectrum of measures to get the Danes to 
use less energy. This did have an impact, especially on heating in private 
households. One conclusion to be drawn is that, at the time, the price increase 
was the most efficient way to regulate energy consumption, which clashed with 
the pre-1973 narrative (i.e., as much as possible, as cheaply as possible). This 
experience facilitated future taxes on the production and use of energy. 
But why were such strong measures applied? And why did the Danish popu-
lation accept these measures as precautions with which they simply had to 
comply? An answer can only be assumed, and I would suggest it can be found in 
the combination of the strong interventionist welfare state and the heavy depend-
ence on Middle Eastern oil. Action needed to be taken to prevent Danish society 
from being strained by lacking or unstable energy supplies. This was, at least, the 
message conveyed in reports published by the Ministry of Commerce.29 
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28  Rüdiger 1998, 53. 
29  Ministry of Commerce 1974, 1975 and 1976. 
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5.  The Strategic Response 
The long-term response also focused on supply security and was based on a 
very thorough effort over several years to make the puzzle pieces fit together. 
As was the case in other Western countries, the Danish administration did a 
comprehensive job of finding long-term responses to the crisis. 
The main actors were in the Ministry of Commerce. In 1968, the parliament 
authorized the ministry to take countermeasures if international conditions 
threatened to create a shortage of required commodities, especially raw materi-
als for industrial or agricultural production, but also fuels.30 This was where the 
proposals for immediate actions, as well as all of the strategic ideas, were con-
ceived. In the 1970s, the number of civil servants addressing energy issues in 
the ministry grew rapidly. In 1976, the Danish Energy Agency was established 
as a ministerial branch, and in 1979 a Ministry of Energy was established as a 
spin-off.31 
The strategy’s formation can be followed in four increasingly comprehen-
sive reports from 1974 to 1979. The reports document that, in questions of the 
energy supply, the decision makers had to start almost from scratch, and the 
basis for decisions constantly expanded and was becoming more and more 
specific. Therefore, in 1979 it was possible – based on built up expertise in the 
ministry and with assistance from private consultants – to make a decision that 
resulted in a multi-tiered energy supply. 
The four reports – published in 1974, 1975, 1976, and 1979 – outlined three 
tasks to accomplish:32 
- Reduce the vulnerability of the energy system by a) initiating a diversifica-
tion process and establishing a multi-tier energy supply, and b) building up 
stocks in accordance with the IEA and EC guidelines. 
- Slow down the growth rate of energy consumption by improving efficiency in 
both production and consumption, and by subsidizing conservation efforts. 
- Coordinate and promote research and development in energy-related issues. 
The first task also included attempts to redirect the total energy consumption 
away from imported and toward national energy sources. Since the ministry did 
not expect renewables to become a reliable source before 1995, the plan 
stressed the necessity of intensified exploration in the Danish part of the North 
                                                             
30  In October 1968, the Ministry of Commerce published a report on natural gas, and it 
stressed that Denmark lacked a coordination of the energy supply. The report discussed the 
option of introducing natural gas to the Danish energy mix, but the only outcome was vain-
ly negotiations with Phillips Petroleum Company in 1970-1971 and the Petronord-group in 
1973 (Rüdiger 2007, 50-3).  
31  Nissen 1981, 176; Rüdiger 2003, 190-2. 
32  Ministry of Commerce 1976, 24-5. From a strategic point of view, this report was the far 
most important. 
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Sea, in order to make natural gas an important fuel in the future energy system. 
Nuclear power was also expected to become one of the pillars of the system, 
but conflicts between the state and the utilities, as well as popular protests, 
postponed the decision, and in 1985, nuclear power was finally excluded from 
Danish energy planning.33 
6.  The New Design  
The 1974 report already gave an outline of the strategy. The starting point was 
a discussion of the weaknesses resulting from the many years of inaction: 
- energy consumption per capita was among the highest in the world; 
- ninety percent of the oil came from the Middle East; 
- the storage capacity was far too small; and 
- the oil crisis hit the country at a time of economic difficulties. 
Therefore, the report suggested increased diversity as the strategy to be fol-
lowed. This had to take into account the following: 
- Security of supply was a high priority, but prices were also of great signifi-
cance. 
- The energy supply should be made more efficient. 
- Behavior should be regulated to reduce the amount of imported fuels, and 
the search for oil and natural gas in the North Sea should be intensified – 
i.e., supplies should to a greater extent be based on national fuels. 
A diversified energy supply was probably an obvious conclusion. The problem 
was how to achieve the diversity and how to define the relationship between 
the different fuels. 
According to the Department of Energy, the overall scenario was a society 
with continued growth. Thus, the main goal was to ensure sufficient energy for 
future growth. One tool was to increase energy efficiency and thus break the 
historical relationship between GDP growth and growth in energy consumption. 
Daniel Yergin coins efficiency as the fifth fuel,34 and he is right that it probably 
has been a major – perhaps the most important – reason for the decoupling 
process from the 1980s onwards. 
If an increased use of domestic fuels was to be implemented, a conflict be-
tween private and public producers was unavoidable. The strategy aimed spe-
cifically at expanding the production of both oil and natural gas in the North 
Sea. As a consequence, the concession, which was held by the private company 
                                                             
33  Petersen 1996. 
34  Yergin 2012, 620-31. 
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Maersk Oil and Gas, Ltd., had to be reformulated.35 The fight between the 
government and Maersk went on for a while, but in the end, Maersk agreed to 
increase the production of oil, as well as to stop flaring (and thus wasting) gas36 
and, instead, send it ashore to be used in Denmark’s natural gas network. 
Figure 1: Growth of GDP and Energy Consumption, 1900-2012 
 
Source: Anders Chr. Hansen: Progress in energy efficiency in Denmark in the twentieth century. 
Presentation at a symposium on the delinking of energy consumption, Roskilde University, 1 
June 2007. Updated 2014 (forthcoming). 
 
The legislation of the late 1970s and the early 1980s represents one of the very 
few cases in which the Danish state was directly involved in the creation of 
resources, and it must be seen as a result of the oil crises of the 1970s, which 
made it obvious that supply security was a fundamental challenge in a modern 
industrialized society. Moreover, the state’s direct involvement was consistent 
with the welfare state tradition that developed after World War II. That is, to an 
increasing extent, the state assumed responsibility of the country’s develop-
ment, in case society or the market failed to function properly. 
As mentioned above, the plan for establishing a diversified energy supply 
set the stage for the introduction of both natural gas and nuclear power. How-
ever, nuclear power was excluded from energy planning because of the prob-
lems with nuclear waste storage and the accident at Three Mile Island in 1979, 
which led to strong opposition against nuclear power plants in Denmark.37 
                                                             
35  Maersk Oil cooperated with Shell and Chevron in the Danish Underground Consortium, 
DUC; cf. Hahn Pedersen 1997.  
36  Flaring gas is the burning of natural gas associated with oil extraction processes. 
37  Petersen 1996. 
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Probably the most far-reaching decision was the construction of a natural 
gas grid from 1979 to 1984,38 based on gas coming from the Danish part of the 
North Sea. The fully state-owned natural gas company, DONG Ltd., was re-
sponsible for the construction process and for the transmission of the gas, while 
five regional companies took care of the final distribution to end users. During 
the first years, the natural gas project encountered serious problems. Since gas 
prices were tied to the price of oil, and because oil prices dropped in the 1980s, 
the economic basis for the entire project evaporated. It was rescued by parlia-
ment,39 however, which pumped more money into it.40 
Thus, other measures remained for ensuring diversification. A third tool was 
forcing the Danish power plants into a large-scale transformation: from using 
oil to burning coal, a change that was initiated in the late 1970s and concluded 
in 1984/85 (i.e., the process lasted approximately five years). The legal founda-
tion for this operation was a law enacted in 1976. This legislation regulated the 
electricity sector as a whole for the first time. One of the main points was that 
the Minister of Commerce41 could instruct a power plant to adjust production to 
a certain type of fuel. The minister immediately used this authority, asking 
several power stations to substitute coal for oil.42 Today, we know this was not 
a wise strategy. One more subsequent shift has been made, and today the ma-
jority of Danish electricity is produced with natural gas. 
The changes in the 1970s involved the centralization of the energy supply. 
This was not a new situation for the electricity supply, but the gas (coal gas) 
grid had previously consisted of small distinct units, each supplying power to a 
town or a part of a town. The coal gas was used especially for cooking, but this 
had been on the decline since 1945, because it was no longer associated with 
being modern. Moreover, since the gas was wet, it was greasy in comparison to 
electricity.43 
However, there was one exception to centralization. District heating and 
combined heat and power (CHP) continued to be a decentralized structure, in 
part because of technical limitations, but also because this was a local political 
desire. Decentralization was further strengthened in the 1990s, when the Minis-
ter of Energy established a large number of small plants in the countryside, 
                                                             
38  The grid closest to Germany was taken into use in 1982 as a test of the gas project; Ruhrgas 
delivered the gas. 
39  From 1973 to 2001, the legislation and other parliamentary decisions on energy policy was 
headed by the Social Democratic and the Liberal party and supported by most of the other 
political parties in the parliament. Thus, energy policy was not sensitive to the changing 
colors of governments. This is not to claim an overall agreement; certain issues, such as en-
ergy taxes and the relevance of a state-owned company (i.e., DONG Ltd), were subject to 
ongoing disputes (Rüdiger 1999). 
40  Rüdiger 1998, 2007. 
41  From 1979 the Minister of Energy. 
42  Wistoft 1992, 176. 
43  Rüdiger 2011. 
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mainly based on natural gas. They were not welcomed by the more traditional 
power stations, and many investments and reconstruction efforts were spent on 
turning them into feasible CHP stations.44  
To sum up, the first oil crisis changed the rules of the game from a largely 
market-driven model to a policy-driven system; planning and regulation were 
the preferred tools implemented to guarantee supply security in the electricity 
and natural gas sectors, to reduce dependency on oil, and to curb the increase in 
energy consumption; and the latter was to be accomplished by either improving 
efficiency or urging the Danes to conserve energy. In the effort to meet these 
targets, planning was the main instrument, but taxes and financial incentives 
were also used to change consumer behavior. The Danish energy sector entered 
onto a new path.45 
7.  The Response to the 1979 Crisis 
In 1979, the second oil crisis caused another substantial price increase and 
elucidated the fact that the energy market had become volatile with sudden and 
unexpected price changes.  
The crisis once again stressed the need to diversify the energy supply and 
for the continued efficiency of both power generation and consumption. In addi-
tion, the high prices once again taught consumers the benefits of saving energy, 
and the state introduced new incentives to improve energy efficiency and curb 
energy consumption.46 But the Social Democratic government also put effort into 
expanding the state control of and the political impact on the energy sector. 
In October of 1979, the Ministry of Energy was invented as a spin-off of the 
Ministry of Commerce. The first-appointed minister was Poul Nilsson, a Social 
Democrat who wanted to go further down the path of state interventionism. He 
insisted that the public should have a significantly greater impact on the explo-
ration and production of hydrocarbons in the North Sea. The inspiration for this 
came from Norway and the United Kingdom, and the task was to change the 
actual concession, which was unfavorable for the state and society, to an 
agreement that was more favorable.47 The Danish Parliament passed a series of 
laws in 1981, and Maersk Oil and Gas was forced to relinquish a large part of 
the licence area not in production to the state, which would then periodically 
provide licences according to the open-door principle. Furthermore, the state-
                                                             
44  Skov; Petersen 2007, 147. 
45  Before 1973, gasoline was almost the only fuel subject to taxes. Tax on electricity was 
introduced in 1977 and was raised in 1985 and 1986. Natural gas was exempted from taxes 
until 1996. 
46  Ministry of Energy 1990, 27-34. 
47  Hanisch and Nerheim 1992, chapters 5 and 6.  
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owned company DONG Ltd. was to be a “carried partner” in all licences. Fi-
nally, it was determined that the oil would be transported ashore to Denmark. 
This legislation introduced a new regulatory regime, and the Danish state 
adopted the policy of exerting greater influence on the exploration and production 
of hydrocarbons. This regulatory regime, in combination with improved energy 
efficiency and a focus on energy saving, constitute the permanent result of the 
crisis. The growth in the gross energy consumption began to level out in the late 
1970s (cf. figure 1),48 whereas the increased direct state influence was rolled back 
by the EU’s demands for liberalization and competition in the energy market.49 
8.  Wind Power 
The plan for diversification left only a small space for alternative energy – only 
4 percent was supposed to come from renewable resources in the 1990s. But 
the plan also claimed that more money was to be invested in R&D on renewa-
bles, especially wind energy.50 The oil crisis revitalized the construction of 
wind turbines, which had a long history in Denmark for very good reasons. 
Popular and political interest in and support for alternative energy was increas-
ing in the 1970s. Those strongly opposed to nuclear power saw wind and solar 
power as alternatives. A very popular slogan linked the fight against the Swe-
dish nuclear power plant (to be located in Barsebäck, 20km from Copenhagen) 
with the fight for sun and wind power.51 
The interest in wind power originated from idealistic engineers and was an-
chored in left-wing NGOs inspired by the Limits to Growth movement and its 
effort to create a non-market-based society. However, from the mid-1970s, the 
idea of alternative energy resources found its way to commercial companies. In 
1976, the first modern wind turbines appeared in the landscape, and in 1979, 
the Danish company Vestas began producing turbines. The third oil crisis in the 
mid-1980s, with extremely low prices, was devastating for wind power, how-
ever. Vestas, for example, almost went bankrupt when California phased out its 
subsidy for wind turbines in 1986.  
The existing power companies opposed wind power, as they found it too ex-
pensive and too cumbersome. The Brundtland Report changed the picture with 
its demands for energy conservation and renewable energy. In Denmark, the 
center-right government proposed a new energy plan in 1990, Energy 2000, 
which included ambitious targets for reducing energy consumption and CO2 
emissions. This plan changed the energy discourse from giving priority to 
                                                             
48  Ministry of Energy 1990, 28. 
49  See Bartle 2005. 
50  Ministry of Commerce 1976, 33. 
51  Petersen 1996. 
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supply security to placing energy’s impact on the environment high on the 
political agenda. Energy saving, improved efficiency, and “cleaner” energy 
were the main targets of the future energy sector. The term cleaner energy 
indicated that renewables – especially wind and biomass – in combination with 
natural gas were planned to be the backbone in the energy mix, thus reducing 
the negative effect of diversification and the reintroduction of coal as the main 
fuel in electricity generation.52 
The plan also set the scene for a more active use of energy taxes and for 
more active and serious participation in international institutions for the pur-
pose of paving the way for a sustainable development.53 Sustainability had 
irrevocably entered the vocabulary of Danish energy planning, and the gov-
ernment had paved the way for Denmark’s international position as one of the 
frontrunners in greening the energy sector. There was a long way to go, how-
ever, as the response to the energy crises of the 1970s turned Denmark into one 
of the world’s most CO2 emitting countries.54 
9.  Concluding Remarks 
The role of the 1973 oil crisis as a game changer can be described as a major 
showdown with the laissez-faire approach to energy consumption prior to the 
onset of the crisis. Before 1973/74, there were taxes on gasoline and heating oil 
and only few rules on electricity supply. The Suez Crisis in 1956 was an eye-
opener, which made clear that energy and supply security had become a pair 
that were indispensable to modern society; yet the crisis had many practical 
consequences, as well. The Six Day War in 1967 inspired the Ministry of 
Commerce to outline a plan for the introduction of natural gas, but this effort 
foundered because it was not possible to buy gas in sufficient quantities at an 
acceptable price. 
However, the oil crisis of 1973/74 was a challenge that was big and concrete 
enough to make it clear that the Danish energy supply could not continue on its 
current path. New measures had to be taken. One such measure was govern-
ment regulation of the market, which had two consequences. After 1973/74, 
energy policy was conceived of in national terms – i.e., the state and the state 
owned oil and gas company, DONG Ltd., played an increasingly important and 
privileged role. In this regard, Denmark was a latecomer, as compared to Nor-
way and the United Kingdom. Furthermore, although the state dirigism did not 
come to characterize the Danish energy policy to the same degree as in Nor-
way, the implementation of the EU Internal Energy Market became a chal-
                                                             
52  Ministry of Energy 1990, 89-102. 
53  Ministry of Energy 1990, 105. 
54  Ministry of Energy 1990, 18. 
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lenge, which had no solution until a dramatic consolidation and reorganization 
process of the energy supply was implemented from 2003 to 2006.55 
The second consequence was the establishment of a strong regulative re-
gime. As indicated, in its early stage, this was already a regime with many 
regulatory tools, such as prohibition, injunction, subsidies, standards, incentives, 
etc. It was classic welfare-state regulation, characterized by bureaucratic or 
sometimes even command-and-control regulation, in which the state carried the 
overall responsibility for development.  
Subsequently, the regime has undergone changes, but the very existence of a 
state regulatory regime has facilitated the transformation of Danish energy 
policy to be more in line with the greater international emphasis on the envi-
ronment and the climate. This does not necessarily mean, however, that gov-
ernment regulation itself is good for the energy sector. 
The oil crisis of 1973/74 was an international crisis, but in the Western 
world, the responses to the crisis were national. Denmark acted on the deci-
sions in the EC, OECD, and IEA, but the mindset and the initiatives launched 
in the 1970s and 1980s and during the years preceding the Energy 2000 plan 
focused on the national level. As the articles in this HSR Special Issue demon-
strate, the different countries used the same tools, more or less, to reduce the 
effects of the 1970s oil crises. This would suggest that an exchange of ideas and 
experiences took place across national borders, but for Denmark, this is still a 
topic to be examined.  
In conclusion, the oil crises of the 1970s caused a substantial change in 
Denmark’s energy sector and its energy policy and planning. The focus was on 
supply security and, thus, on the creation of a diversified supply. An unintend-
ed consequence of the reintroduction of coal as an alternative to oil was very 
high per capita CO2 emissions. Therefore, when environmental and climatic 
issues captured the focus of the political agenda in the 1990s and 2000s, anoth-
er reformulation of the country’s energy policy was needed. Consequently, 
sustainability became the determining issue of Danish energy planning in the 
1990s and paved the way for a fast greening of the energy sector. 
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